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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRANK M. BARBER and
:
MARIO T. BARBER, by and
through his guardian ad litem, :
Ray Harding Ivie,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
:

Case No. 860216

vs.
:

Priority No. 13(b)

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
De fendant/Re spondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Utah's Financial Responsibility Act has long mandated
that insurers provide liability coverage where their insureds
are involved in an accident while operating a non-owned vehicle
with

permission.

Defendant,

Farmers

Insurance

Exchange,

provided in their policy of insurance an exclusion which would
limit non-owned vehicle coverage to those instances where the
insured

was

operating

a

"four-wheeled

land

motor

vehicle".

Appellant, an insured of Farmers Insurance Exchange, contends
that the exclusion of coverage where the insured is operating a
non-owned motorcycle is invalid in that it violates the letter
and intent of Utah's Financial Responsibility Act, and that the
exclusion violates public policy.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, Section 31-41-2 (1953).
NATURE OF THE CASE
After

borrowing

a

friend's

motorcycle,

appellant

Mario Barber was involved in an accident with a pickup truck in
the parking lot of Orem High School.
force

a

collision

policy

with

The pickup truck had in

Farmers

Insurance

Exchange.

Mario Barber was also an insured under a policy of Farmers
Insurance

Exchange

issued to his

father.

Farmers extended

collision coverage to repair the pickup truck, and then sued
their insured, Mario Barber, as well as his father (on a theory
of statutory liability due to the father's signing of a minor's
drivers license application).

The Barbers tendered the defense

of the action to their insurer, Farmers Insurance Exchange, who
denied coverage based on an exclusion in their policy which
limits non-owned coverage to those instances where the nonowned vehicle has "four wheels11.
The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant
Farmers
valid.

Insurance

Exchange

holding

that

the

exclusion

was

The court ruled that the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act

had incorporated Utah's Safety Responsibility Act, and that a
specific

exclusion

for

motorcycles

in

the

No-Fault

Act

permitted an insured to exclude liability coverage while the
insured is operating a non-owned motorcycle•

-2-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant

Frank

M. Barber

had

been

a

long

time

insured of Farmers Insurance Exchange. When his son, appellant
Mario Barber, reached the age of 16 and received a drivers
license,

his

George, and

father

called

requested

that

Farmers
Mario

Insurance

be

given

agent, Tommy

full

insurance

coverage to the same extent as any other family member.

(R.

203) .
After notifying his Farmers1 agent that his 16-year
old

son had

received

a

premiums were increased.

license, Frank

Barber's

insurance

(R. 203).

On March 21, 1983, Mario Barber was involved in an
accident in the parking lot of Orem High School after borrowing
a friend's uninsured motorcycle.

The accident occurred when

Mario Barber drove into a vehicle operated.by Robert Bernards,
also an insured of Farmers Insurance Exchange.
Shortly

after

the

accident,

(R. 106).

Farmers

Insurance

Exchange cancelled all coverage for the Barber policy under the
contract of insurance issued to appellant Frank Barber.

(R.

204) (Affidavit of Frank M. Barber).
Farmers
coverage

for

policy

damage

with

Bernards

sustained

to

the

provided
Bernards'

collision
vehicle.

Farmers paid to have the vehicle repaired pursuant to the
Bernards' policy,

(R. 5, 80). Following payment to Bernards,

Farmers acted pursuant to the subrogation rights given them in
the Bernards policy, and brought suit in the name of Bernards
against Mario Barber, the owner of the motorcycle Barber was
-3-

operating, and "John Does 1 through 5 n .

(R. 106). One of the

John Doe defendants was identified as the person signing Mario
Barber's

drivers

license

application.

(R.

143)

(Amended

Complaint) .
After

being

sued by their insurance

Barbers were forced to seek legal assistance.

company, the
They retained

attorneys to defend the suit brought against them by their
insurance

company, and the attorneys

in

turn

tendered

the

defense of the lawsuit brought against the Barbers to Farmers
Insurance Exchange.
the

policy

Farmers denied coverage on the basis that

between

Farmers

and

Barber

excluded

liability

coverage while the insured was operating a non-owned vehicle
with less than four wheels.

(R. 106-107).

The Barbers privately retained attorneys then assumed
the defense of the action brought against the Barbers by their
insurance company.

After a significant amount of legal action,

Farmers eventually

dismissed

their suit, without prejudice,

claiming that it was not worth the effort of prosecuting.

(R.

106) .
Following

the

dismissal

of

Farmers

against Barber, the Barbers

against

Farmers,

claiming

that

the

suit

brought

by

filed the present suit

Farmers

had

breached

its

contract of insurance by refusing to defend or indemnify.

The

Barbers further claimed the breach of a fiduciary duty, intentional interference with the plaintiff's property interest,
willful and malicious conduct on the part of Farmers, violation

-4-

of Insurance Department Regulations and Statutes, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

(R. 108).

The parties moved for summary judgment.
holding

that

Farmers

could

validly

exclude

The court's

coverage

was

dispositive of all claims, and the present appeal was taken.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellants maintain that the trial court improperly
applied

Utah's

Farmers

was

instance.

statutory

permitted

insurance

to

deny

scheme

liability

in

ruling

coverage

in

that
this

The legislature clearly mandated in the Financial

Responsibility Act that insurers licensed to do business in
this state provide coverage to their insureds while operating
non-owned vehicles with permission.
vehicle" contained

The definition of "motor

in the Act does not draw a distinction

between two and four-wheeled motor vehicles.
Despite the definition of motor vehicle contained in
the

Financial

Responsibility

Act, the

trial

court

granted

summary judgment in favor of respondent based upon an apparent
exclusion in Utah's No-fault Act which purportedly permits an
insurer

to exclude

motorcycles.

no-fault benefits

to

the

operators

of

Appellants respectfully contend that the court

erred in three respects.

First, appellants maintain that the

legislative intent in mandating liability coverage for "motor
vehicles" was clear and unambiguous in including motorcycles
within the class of vehicles requiring liability coverage.
is

appellants' argument

that

the

trial

court

should

It

have

applied the definition in the Financial Responsibility Act in
-5-

determining

the

question of

liability

coverage, instead of

using an exclusion in the No-Fault Act which relates solely to
no-fault

benefits.

Second, the trial

court was apparently

unaware of a prior Utah Supreme Court decision, Coates v.
American Economy, 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981), which reviewed the
purported exclusion in the No-Fault Act and extended no-fault
benefits in the exact situation presented here.
No-Fault Act itself

Finally, the

recites that it has no application in

property damage cases such as is presented in the present case.
Finally, appellants maintain that to create a gap in
liability coverage such as that contemplated in the present
case would be in violation of the public policy articulated by
the Utah Supreme Court in recent decisions.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT
IN UPHOLDING THE MOTORCYCLE EXCLUSION TO
THE NON-OWNED VEHICLE COVERAGE PROVIDED IN
THE POLICY OF INSURANCE.
For

decades, the

courts

and

legislatures

of

our

various states have recognized the necessity for public liability

insurance to protect victims of

automobile

accidents.

Accordingly, insurers who are authorized to do business in a
state must conform their policies of insurance to satisfy the
statutory mandates which have been deemed necessary to provide
that public protection which the legislature deems necessary.
The Utah legislature has codified the requirements for automobile

liability

insurance

Annotated, 1953.

Included

in

Section

41-12-21, Utah

Code

in the statutory mandate is the
-6-

requirement that automobile liability policies provide coverage
where the insureds are operating a non-owned motor vehicle with
permission.

Specifically, the statute provides:

(b)
such
insurance:

owners

policy

of

liability

(1)
shall
designate
by
explicit
description or by appropriate reference all
motor vehicles with
respect
to
which
coverage is thereby to be granted; and
(2) shall insure the person named
therein and any other person, as insured,
using such motor vehicle or motor vehicles
with the express or implied permission of
such named insured, against loss from the
liability
imposed
by
law
for
damages
arising out of the ownership, maintenance
or use of such motor vehicle . . . in the
amount specified in Section 41-12-1(k) of
this act.
(c)
such operators policy of liability
insurance shall insure the person named as
insured therein against loss from the
liability imposed by him by law for damages
arising out of the use by him of any motor
vehicle not owned by him, within the same
territorial limits and subject to the same
limits of liability as are set forth above
with respect to an owners policy of liability insurance.
(d)
such motor vehicle liability policy
shall state the name and address of the
named insured, the coverage afforded by the
policy, the premium charged therefor, the
policy period, and the limits of liability,
and shall contain an agreement or be
endorsed that insurance is provided thereunder
in accordance with the coverage
defined in this act as respects bodily
injury or death or property damage, or
both, and is subject to all the provisions
of this act. (emphasis added)
In the present

case, Farmers

appears

to

raise

no

dispute that Mario Barber would have been entitled to complete

-7-

and full protection under the terms of his father's insurance
policy, had the vehicle he had borrowed from his friend been a
four-wheel automobile instead of a motorcycle.

However, it is

appellants' contention that the requirements of

the

Safety

Responsibility Act do not permit for such a distinction.
to be stressed

that the requirements

It is

for non-owned vehicle

coverage as contained in Section 41-12-21, refers to liability
coverage for the use of non-owned "motor vehicles".

The term

"motor vehicles", is specifically defined in the Safety Responsibility Act so as to avoid any possible ambiguity.

Section

41-12-l(e), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states as follows:
'Motor vehicle1 means every self-propelled
vehicle which is designed for use upon a
highway, including
trailers and semitrailers
designed
for use with such
vehicles (except traction engines, road
rollers, farm tractors, tractor cranes,
power shovels and well drillers) and every
vehicle which is propelled by electric
power obtained from overhead wires but not
operated upon rails.
It is beyond

cavil that the definition of

"motor

vehicles" as contained in the Act mandating the requirement for
automobile
motorcycles.

liability

insurers,

would

include

two-wheeled

However, an examination of the policy exclusion

relied upon by Farmers in the present case shows that the
exclusion is clearly repugnant to the classification provided
by

the

legislature

in

establishing

requirements

for

which

vehicles must be covered by a liability policy written pursuant
to the Utah Safety Responsibility Act.
upon by Farmers in this case reads:
-8-

The exclusion relied

The unqualified word 'insured1 includes. . .
(b) With respect to a non-owned automobile,
(1)

the named insured or a relative,

and
(2) any other person or organization,
and owning or hiring such automobile if
legally responsible for its use by the
named insured or a relative, but only in
the event such named insured or relative is
legally liable for the occurrence; provided
the actual use of the non-owned automobile
by the persons in (1) and (2) above is with
the permission of the owner.
(R. 60).
In providing this coverage however, Farmers chose to
alter their definitions from those provided in Utah's Financial
Responsibility

Act.

Instead

of

adopting

a

definition

consistent with the legislature's statutory classification of
"motor

vehicles", Farmers

defined

the

term

"automobile"

as

follows:
Automobile means a four wheel land motor
vehicle designed for use principally upon
public roads, except a midget automobile,
and includes any trailer designed for use
with a private passenger automobile.
(R. 6 0 ) .
It
broader

is

class

of

clear

that

the

legislature

motor vehicles

to be

intended

covered by

a

far

liability

insurance policies than that contemplated by Farmers' exclusion
in the present case.
classification

To exclude motorcycles from the statutory

is no more

logical

than

to exclude

non-owned

liability coverage where the insured is operating a car that is
painted red, or a truck outfitted with

a camper.

Even more

important, however, is the fact that the exclusion relied upon
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by Farmers not only provides less protection than the statutory
definition would require, but it makes a mockery of the legislative intent.

There is to be no doubt that the intent of the

legislature in enacting the Safety Responsibility law was to
provide

protection

for the innocent victims of tortfeasors.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 619
P.2d 329 (Utah 1980).

Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d

737 (Utah 1982) . An individual who has suffered loss of life,
limb, or health at the hands of a negligent motor vehicle
operator, suffers no less because the tortfeasor was operating
a motorcycle instead of an automobile.

The injury remains the

same.
To

require

public

liability

insurance

to

provide

compensation to some victims, but not others, draws an unconscionable distinction which our system of justice should not
tolerate.

This court has repeatedly held that such arbitrary

denials of compensation to injured victims will not be approved
In striking down Farmers1

in the State of Utah.
exclusion

clause,

in

striking

down

the

household

automobile

guest

statute, in striking down the products liability statute of
repose, this court has recognized that the injured victims1
rights should not be sacrificed as we apply some arbitrary
classification in assigning the tortfeasor to his procrustean
bed.

Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P. 2d 231 (Utah

1985) (household exclusion); Mai an v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah
19 84)

(automobile

guest

statute); Berry

v. Beech

Aircraft

Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (products liability statute of
repose).
-10-

In upholding the exclusion in the present case, the
trial

court

held

that

the

Utah

No-Fault

Act

incorporates

provisions of the Financial Responsibility Act, and that an
exclusion contained in the No-Fault Act concerning motorcycles
would

permit

the

exclusion

attempted

here

by

Farmers.

Appellants do not dispute that the No-Fault Act and the Safety
Responsibility Act must be read together.
held on at least three occasions.
States Fidelity

This court has so

Allstate Ins. Co. v. United

& Guaranty Co., 619 P.2d

329

(Utah 1980);

Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982);

Malan

v. Lewis, 692 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984).
However, it is appellants1 contention that the trial
court

erred

exclusion

to

in

three

liability

respects
coverage

in

applying

the

the

present

in

Initially, the court's logic should be examined.

No-Fault
case.

The trial

court stated in its ruling of March 26, 1986, (R. 232):
When incorporated into the No-Fault Act
41-12-21(c) requires operator's coverage
for damages arising out of the use of
non-owned vehicles of a kind required to be
registered under Title 41, but excluding,
however, motorcycles. 31-41-3(1).
Appellants' first assignment of error concerning the
trial court's application of the No-Fault exclusion is simply a
question of determining

the controlling

statutory language.

The Safety Responsibility Act contained its own definition of
terms.

It was unnecessary to go to any other section of the

Utah Code to determine the legislature's intent.

The legisla-

ture in mandating public liability insurance required coverage
-11-

for

an

insured

while

operating

Motor vehicle was defined

a non-owned motor vehicle.

in that very

vehicles such as motorcycles.

statute to include

No ambiguity was present which

would require the trial court to search other sections of the
Utah

Code to identify

a different definition.

Indeed, the

court was not even urged to do so by respondent in the court
below.
Furthermore,

the

trial

court

misconstrued

the

purported exclusion for motorcycles contained in the No-Fault
Act.

Apparently, the trial court was unaware that the Supreme

Court had already interpreted that exclusion as it applied to
no-fault benefits, and found that the exclusion was inapplicable in the precise situation which is presented here.

The

court's attention is drawn to its earlier decision in Coates v.
American Economy, 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981), where the purported
exclusion for motorcycles contained in the No-Fault Act was
found to be inapplicable where the motorcycle was involved in a
collision with defined motor vehicle.
A

third

assignment of error

concerning

the trial

court's reliance on the motorcycle exclusion of the No-Fault
Act is of significance.

The present case involves a claim by

appellants for defense and indemnity from their insurer arising
out of an action involving property damage to another's motor
vehicle.

The

No-Fault

Act

specifically

application to property damage claims.
Section 31-41-2, provides:

-12-

excludes

its

own

Utah Code Annotated,

This Act (No-Fault Automobile Insurance
Act) is not designed to have any effect on
property damage claims.
A
While

final parenthetical observation

appellants

are

unable

should be made.

to find specific

authority in

support of this claim, it is respectfully submitted that the
reason why motorcycle accidents are frequently excluded from
no-fault insurance policies is because of the greater severity
of injuries suffered by riders of motorcycles.

Quite clearly,

cyclists are afforded less protection in the event of an automobile collision, and suffer greater injury.
greater cost of no-fault insurance

for

such

Recognizing the
injuries, the

legislature may be within its rights to exclude coverage to
those who assume the risk of operating motorcycles so far as
no-fault

protection

for

their

own

injuries

is

concerned.

However, such a distinction should once again be avoided as it
relates to the innocent victim.

The victim does not choose his

own tortfeasor, nor can he usually

act to avoid the risk.

Rather, the distinction when applied to liability claims as
opposed to no-fault claims, presents an unconscionable scenario
where one victim will be protected while another will not,
solely by virtue of the vehicle his tortfeasor chose to operate
at the time of the negligent conduct.

-13-

CONCLUSION
It is appellants1 contention that Farmers Insurance
Exchange is doing business in the State of Utah as a privilege.
That

privilege

requires

Farmers

to

satisfy

the

statutory

conditions imposed upon automobile liability insurers by our
legislature.

It

is

respectfully

submitted

that

Farmers1

exclusion of non-owned motor vehicle liability coverage where
their insureds are operating a motorcycle, is repugnant to the
letter and intent of Utah's Financial Responsibility Act.
As such, Farmers' conduct in this case can only be
seen as outrageous. When the Barbers purchased their policy of
automobile

insurance, they were

purchasing

However, when the Barbers needed

peace

of

mind.

the protection which they

expected, and which the Financial Responsibility law apparently
requires, they found that their trust in respondent had been
poorly placed.
Barbers,

Not only did Farmers refuse

Farmers

were

the

ones

that

the

to protect the
Barbers

needed

protection from.
In suing their insureds and refusing to provide them
protection, Farmers places their sole reliance on an attempt to
create

a gap

extends

far

submitted

in

public

beyond

that

the

liability

the present
intent

insurance

case.

It

coverage which
is

respectfully

of the legislature

in requiring

financial responsibility by motorists runs directly contrary to
Farmers' efforts to undermine the extent of public liability
law in this state.

It is therefore requested, on behalf of

these appellants and others, that this court find that coverage
-14-

in this case was required by the laws of Utah, and that the
case be remanded for a determination of damages arising from
Farmers' breach of contract and tortious conduct.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th

3

HI1
-E & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
48 North University Avenue
P. 0. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
It is hereby certified that service of the foregoing
Brief of Appellants has been made on counsel for the DefendantRespondent by mailing four copies thereof, with postage prepaid
thereon, this 4th day of August, 1986, properly addressed as
follows:
A. Alma Nelson, Esq.
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPM^N
1300 Continental Bank Build-in
Salt Lake City, Utah 84

IV^E & YOUNG
:torneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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AARON ALMA NELSON
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
Attorneys for Defendant
1300 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (8 01) 3 64-3627
Utah State Bar No. 2379

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FRANK M. BARBER and
MARIO T. BARBER, by and
through his guardian ad
litem, RAY HARDING IVIE,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 66,519

Plaintiffs,
vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Jadgment duly came oefore this Court for hearing
on February 7, 1986, at 11 o'clock a.m.

Plaintiffs appeared througl

their attorney, Ray Pnillips Ivie, and Defendant appealed through
its attorney, Aaron Alma Nelson.

Prior to the hearing the parties

submitted Statements of Points and Authorities, pursuant to Rule
2.6, Rules of Practice in the District and Circuit Courts of the
State of Utah.
After hearing arguments by tne parties and reviewing the
memoranda submittec by tne parties and the Court being fully advisee
tne ruling of tne Court havmc been issued, it is herebv
17-

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgirient is hereby granted and Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby denied.

Defendant is hereby awarded

Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint and action against
Defendant, with prejudice and upon the merits.
DATED this

day of

, 1986-

EY THE COURT:

RAY M. HARDING
DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing proposed SUMMARY JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, this
/&

day of

/fy^/

1986, to:

Mr. Ray Phillips Ivie
Attorney for Plaintiffs
IVIE & YOUNG
P. O. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603

/5./ /

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

FRANK M. BARBER, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

Case Number

66,519

)

vs.

)

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,

)

Defendant.

RULING

)
********

Having
judgment

under

considered
summary

considered
Rule

2.8,

defendant's
heard

argument

motion
on

for

the

summary

matter

and

the memoranda cf the parties, defendant's motion for

judgmert

is granted.

material fact aid defendant

There are no genuine issues of

is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.
The definition of Section 41-12-21 motor vehicle, when
that section is incorporated into the Utah No-Fault Act via 3141-5(1)(a),

is governed

by

the No-Fault

definition of a motor vehicle under
Safety Responsibility Act
41-12-Ke;.
require

It

inasmuch

coverage

that the legislature
for

the

as the

the No-Fault Act and the

(SRA> are inconsistent.

is unlikely

insurance

Act

operation

31-41-3(1),
intended to
of

non-owned

motorcycles by an insured under an act passec^with ;the purpose
of stabilizing the rising costs of automobile insurance.

It is

also noted that insurance polices issued re comply with the NoFault Act must comply with the SRA "except as modified to provide
the benefits and exemptions provided for in [the No-Fault Act]'*.

31-41-5(1)(a).

This

is

e

clear

declaration

that

inconsistent, the No-Fault Act governs over the SRA.

where

Thus, when

41-12-21(c) is incorporated into the No-Fault Act, the 31-41-3(1)
definition of motor vehicles governs.
motorcycles
incorporated

from
into

the

operation

the

of

No-Fault

It specifically excludes
the

Act

No-Fault

Act.

41-12-21(c)

When

requires

operator's coverage for damages arising out of the use of nonowned vehicles of a kind required to be registered under Title
41, but excluding, however, motorcycles.

31-41-3(1).

Since plaintiff's insurance policy did not cover him
for the use of non-owned motorcycles, defendant had no duty to
defend plaintiff under the terms of the policy, defendant cannot
be held liable to plaintiffs for failure to defend, and judgment
is granted for defendant on its motion.

Plaintiff's conplaint is

dismissed as to all causes of action.
Defendant to prepare an appropriate order.
DATED this ^ ^ a a \ ' of Mar**rr^J986.

cc:

Ray Phillips Ivie, Esc.
Sherman C. Young, Esc.
A. Alma Nelson, Esq.
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eiudc: Colorado. Conner-ticut. Delaware.
F i o n a s , {JCOTSIL. Hawaii. Kansas. K e r tucKy. M a r y l a n d . Massachusetts. Michigan,
Minnesota. N e v a d a . Nev Jersey, Nev
York. Orecoi;. Pcunsyivanij,. Puerto Kico
and South C a r o m s .
Cross-Re ference.
6Safety Responsibility
seq

Ac:.

14-32-1

ct

L a v Reviews.
No-Fault Automobile I n s u r a n c e ir; Utah
— S t a t e Constitutional Issues,. 1970 Utah
L Kev. 24S.
Compensation Svstems and Utah'* N 0
p a u } t S t a t u t e , 1973 U t a h L. Kev. 383.
Countrywide Overview of Automobile
No-Fault' I n s u r a n c e . 23 Defense L. J. 443
(1974 .

31-41-2. Purpose of act—Property damage claims not affected.—The
purpose of this act is to require the payment of certain prescribed benefits
in respect to motor vehicle accidents through either insurance or other
approved security but on the basis of no fault, preserving, however, the
right of arj injured person to pursue the customary tort claims where the
most serious types of injuries occur. The intention of the legislature is
hereby to possibly stabilize, if not effectuate certain savings in, the rising
costs of automobile accident insurance and to effectuate a more efficient,
equitable method of handling the greater bulk of the personal injuryclaims that arise out of automobile accidents, these being those not involving great amounts of damages. This act is not designed to have any effect
on property damage claims.
History: L. 197S, ch. 55, § 2.
Collateral References.
InsuranceC=>4.1.
44 C.J.6. Insurance § 64.

Bee Am. Jur. 2d. No-Fault Insurance
S$ 1-34, when published.
*"
Validity and construction of ''no-fault''
automobile insurance plans, 42 A. L. E. 3d
229.

31-41-3. Definition of terms.—As used in this a c t :
(I)
"Motor vehicle" means any vehicle of a kind required to be
registered under Title 41, but excluding, however motorcycles.
(2- "Person" includes every natural person, firm, partnership, association, corporation, or any governmental entity, or agency of it.
(3j "Owner* means a person who holds the legal title to a motor
vehicle, or in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of a security agreement or lease with option to purchase with the debtor or lessee having the
right to possession, then the debtor or lessee shall be deemed the owner for
purposes of this act.
(4
"Insured* means the named insured, the spouse or other relative
of the named insured who reside in the same household as the named insured, including those who usually make their home in the same household
but temporarily live elsewhere, or any person using the described motor
vehicle with the permission, either expressed or implied, of the owner.
(5
"Occupying* means being IL or upori a motor vehicle as a passenger or operator or engaged in the immediate acts of entering, boarding,
or alighting from a motor vehicle
(6
"Pedestrian* means any natural person not occupying or riding
upon a motor vehicle
«"T "Department" means the Utah insurance department
Hisiory: I*. 1973. en. 55. $ S
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9. Special ami-theft laws
10. Offenses against registration laws — suspension or revocation of
registration.
11. Registration and license fees.
12. Penalties.
IS. Automobile driver education tax.
ARTICLE 1
WORDS AND PHRASES DEFINED
Section
41-1-1 Definitions

41-1-1. Definitions. The following words and phrases when used in this
act shall, for the purpose of this act, have the following meanings respectively ascribed to them:
(a) "Vehicle." Every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices
moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.
(b> "Motor Vehicle." Even- vehicle which is self-propelled and every
vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley
wires, but not operated upon rails
(c) "Motorcycle." Every motor vehicle having a saddle for the use of
the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact
with the ground, but excluding a tractor.
(di "Truck Tractor." Even- motor vehicle designed and used primarily
for drawing other vehicles and not so constructed as to carry a load other
than a part of the weight of the vehicle and load so drawn.
(ei "Farm Tractor." Even motor vehicle designed and used primarily
as a farm implement for drawing plows, mowing machines, and other
implements of husbandry
(f "Road Tractor " Even motor vehicle designed and used for drawing
other vehicles and not so constructed as to earn any load thereon either
independently or any part of the weight of a vehicle or load so drawn.
(g "Trailer " Even* vehicle without motive power designed for carrying
persons or property and for being drawn by a motor vehicle and so constructed that no pan of its weight rests upon the towing vehicle
(h "Semitrailer " Even vehicle without motive power designed for
carrying persons or propern and for being drawn by a motor vehicle and
so constructed thai some part of its weight and that of its load rests or
is carried DY another vehicle
(i« "Specialiy Constructed Vehicle " Every vehicle of a type required to
be registered hereunder not originally constructed under a distinctive
name, maKe. mode^, or type by a generaln recognizee manufacturer of
vehicles and no; materially altered from its original construction
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41-12-1
41-12-30
41-12-31
41-12-32

41-12-3$
41-12-34
41-12-35
41-12-36
41-12-37
41-12-38
41-12-39
41-12-40.
41-12-41.

MOTOR VEHICLES
Registration of vehicle — Effect of guspensioc — Transfer of registration —
Rights of conditional vendor, chattel mortgagee, or lessor
Return of license and registration to commission — When required — Penalty
Crimes and penalties — Failure to repon accident — False reports — Forgad
or unauthorized evidence or proof of financial responsibility — Driving %ttm
suspension or revocation of license or registration, or nonresident s operatiw
privilege
Publicly owned vehicles — Applicability of act to
Certificate of self-insurance — Issuance — Cancellation
Automobile liability policies — Equitable apportionment among companies tf
applicants — Appeal to insurance commissioner — Petition in district court.
Repealing clause
Retroactivity of act.
Remedies as cumulative or exclusive.
Interpretation and construction of act.
Separability clause.
Short title.

41-12-1. Definitions. As used in this act:
(a) "Commission" means the department of public safety.
(b) "Department" means the division of safety and financial
bility of the department of public safety.
(c) "Judgment" means any judgment which shall have become final
expiration without appeal of the time within which an appeal might
been perfected, or by final affirmation on appeal, rendered by a court
competent jurisdiction of any state or of the United States, upon a
of action arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any
vehicle, for damages, including damages for care and loss of ser
because of bodily injury to or death of any person, or for damages
of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use
or upon a cause of action on an agreement of settlement for such
(d) "License* means any license, temporary instruction permit
temporary license issued under the laws of this state pertaining to
licensing of persons to operate motor vehicles
(e> "Motor vehicle" means every self-propelled vehicle wn
designed for use upon a highway, including trailers and semi;
designed for use with such vehicles (except traction engines, road
farm tractors, tractor cranes, power shovels, and well drillers) and
vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead
but not operated upon rails.
(f) "Nonresident" means every person who is not a resident
state.
(g) "Nonresident's operating privilege" means the privilege
upon a nonresident by the laws of this state pertaining to the o;
by him of a motor vehicle, or the use of a motor vehicle owned,
in this state.
(h) "Owner" means a person who holds a legal title of a motor
or in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of an agreement for
ditional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon peri
of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate
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possession vested in the conditional vendee or lessee, or in the event a
mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then such conditional
vendee or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the purpose
nf this act.
(i) "Operator" means every person who is in actual physical control of
* motor vehicle.
(j) "Person" means every natural person, firm, copartnership, association or corporation.
(k) "Proof of financial responsibility" means the proof of ability to
respond in damages for liability, on account of accidents occurring subsequent to the effective date of this proof, arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, in the amount of $20,000 because
of bodily injury to or death of one person, in any one accident, and, subject
ID this limit for one person, in the amount of $40,000 because of bodily
injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and in the
amount of $10,000 because of injury to or destruction of property of others
in any one accident, or in lieu of the foregoing limits, a single limit of
not less than $30,000.
(1) "Registration" means the certificate or certificates and registration
plates issued under the laws of this state pertaining to the registration
<tf motor vehicles.
(m) "State" means any state, territory or possession of the United
States, the District of Columbia, or any province of the Dominion of Canada.
History: L. 1951. ch 71, §1; C 1943.
lopp., 57-13-41; L. 1951 (1st S.S.), ch. 10, § 1;
U6L ch. 93, § 1; 1973, ch. 91,11; 1981. ch. 185,
II
Casapiler's Now*.
The 1951 (1st S.S.t amendment substituted
*tospartment of public safety" for **tax comariafion of this state'* in subd. (a): and substHsftad "division of safety and financial
ibility of the department of public
in subd. (b) for Inotor vehicle div>i i f the stat* tax commission '
1961 Amendment increased the proof
responsibility amounts in subd
lirom $5,000 to $10,000 for injury or deati
t person; from $10,000 to $20,000 for
or death of two or more personE: and
$1,000 to $5,000 for injury or destrucI K of property
^Ute 197? amendment rewrote the introdurISJPT paragraph substituted **$i5,000' for
SNMOCr and "$30,000" for "$20,000" in subd
mk added ~or in lieu of the foregoing kmits
* Mgie limit of not less that $25,000" tc
. (k;: and made minor cn&nges in phrase""^lie 1981 amendment increased the proof
tf financial responsibility amounts in subd

(k> from $15,000 to $20,000 for injury- or
death of one person; from $30,000 tc $40,000
for injury* or death of two or more persons;
from $5,000 to $10,000 for injury or destruction of property; increased the single limit
minimum from $25,000 tc $30,000 it subd
(k/; and made a minor change in phraseology
Title of Act.
An act tc be entitled the Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act, providing for
giving proof of financial responsibility by
owners and operators of motor vehicles violating the motor vehicle laws of the state of
Utah or involved in an accident in whicr
damages result in excess of $1GC, requiring
the giving of security for the payment of
damages providing for the suspension of
operator? licenses and registration certificates until sucn security is furnished, providing for the appointment of the secretary of
the state of Utah as process agent for notresidents using the highways of this state ir
actions arising out of any accidents; prescribing the procedure to mate proof of hnancia
responsibility, and prescribing penalties for
violations hereof, and other matters relating
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thereto; and repealing Chapter 68, Law6 of
Utah 194S - Laws 1951, ch. 71.
Effective Date.
Section 2 of Laws 1951 (1st S.S.). ch 10
provided: "This act shall take effect July 1.
1951"
Cross-Reference*.
Words and phrases denned by statute, construction of, 68-3-11
Hearing requirement*..
Motorist who had received notice that his
license would be suspended under this act
and who did not pursue his remedies at state
level was not deprived of due process.
MacBeth v. State (1971) 332 F Supp 1191.
Police power of state.
The state, in the exercise of its police
power, may reasonably regulate the use of its
highways, with the objective, among others,
of minimizing the hardship flowing from the
financial irresponsibility of users involved in
accidents- In re Kesier (1960) 187 F Supp 277,
affirmed in 369 US 153, 7 L Ed 2d 641, 82 S Ct
807
Proof of financial responsibility.
Insurance policies used as security under
31-41-5 of the No-Fault Insurance Act must
include the minimum liability limits detailed
in subsec. (ki definition of proof of financial
responsibility. Allstate Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity £ Guaranty Co (1980) 619 P 2d 329
Collateral Reference*.
Automobiles §=> 147
60 CJS Motor Vehicles §164.50; 60A CJS
Motor Vehicles 5§ 248,268, 271.

Compulsory insurance, 7 AmJur 2d 464 A
seQ.. Automobile Insurance §20 et nTj
Financial responsibility or security Tsqaa^
ments. 7A AmJur 2d 332-346, Autom^iw
and Highway Traffic H 156-170
Cancellation of compulsory or "financ^f
responsibility" automobile insurance, 34 kim
2d 1297
tf
Construction and application of automatic
insurance clause or substitution provision m
automobile liability or indemnity policy M
ALR 2d 936
;
Construction and effect of exclusionarr
clause in automobile liability policy m * S S
policy inapplicable where vehicle is used a s
''public or livery' conveyance," 30 ALE 2d H k
Effect of provision of liability pobcy cof^T
ing hired automobiles but excluding fro*
definition of "insured" the owner of soch
vehicle or his employee, 32 ALR 2d 572.
H|
Insured's first accident, policy provision
extending coverage to comply with Fina&ctf
Responsibility Act as applicable to, 8 ALfiM
38fc
s
Liability of insurer under compulsory a&?
utory vehicle liability policy, to injured thai
persons, notwithstanding insured's failure %s
comply with policy conditions, as measuifl
by policy limits or by limits of Financial
Responsibility Act. 29 ALR 2d 817
Modern status of rules regarding materidR
ity and effect of false statement by insuraMi
applicant as to previous insurance cancellations or rejections. 66 ALR 3d 74£
|
Presumption and prima facie case ai 1%
ownership of vehicle causing highwav aock.
dent, 27 ALR 2d 167.
*
'£
Trailers as affecting automobile insurance^
31 ALR 2d 29b
^
Validity of Motor Vehicle Fi&ane
Responsibility Act 35 ALR 2d 1011

41-12-2. Administration and enforcement of act — Judicial
of order or act of commission — Hearing on probability of
on part of uninsured operator, (a) The commission shall administer
enforce the provisions of this act and may make rules and reguial
necessary for its administration
(b) Any person aggrieved by an order or an act of the commission
within ten days after notice thereof, file a petition in the district court
a review thereof; but the filing of such petition shall not suspend the
or act unless a stay thereof shall be allowed by a judge of said court
ing final determination of the review. The court shall summarily hear
petition and may make any appropriate order or decree
(c) At any time within twenty days after providing notice that the
mission is suspending an operator's license because of probability of lial
ity on the pari of an uninsured operator, the operator whose license is
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(b) If any insurance carrier not authorised to transact business in this
state, which has qualified to furnish proof of financial responsibility,
defaults in any said undertakings or agreements, the commission shall not
thereafter accept as proof any certificate of said carrier whether theretofore filed or thereafter tendered as proof* so long as sucb default continues.
History: L 1951, ch 71, § 20; C. 1943,
Supp., 57-13-60.

41-12-21. Motor vehicle liability policy — Definition — Provisions
Coverage, (a) A "motor vehicle liability policy" as said term is used
in this act shall mean an owner's or an operators policy of liability insurance, certified as provided in section 41-12-19 or section 41-12-20 as proof
of financial responsibility, and issued, except as otherwise provided in
section 41-12-20, by an insurance carrier duly authorized to transact business in this state, to or for the benefit of the person named therein as
insured.
(b) Such owner's policy of liability7 insurance:
(1) shall designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference
all motor vehicles with respect to which coverage is thereby to be granted;
and
(2) shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as
insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express
or implied permission of such named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance
or use of sucb motor vehicle or motor vehicles within the United States
of America or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, with respect to each such motor vehicle, in the amount specified in section 41-12-1 (k) of this act
(c» Sucb operator's policy of liability insurance shall insure the person
named as insured therein against loss from the liability imposed upon him
by law for damages arising out of the use by him of any motor vehicle
not owned by him. within the same territorial limits and subject to the
same limits of liability as are set fortb above with respect to an owners
policy of liability insurance
id Suck motor vehicle liability policy shall state the name and address
of the named insured, the coverage afforded by the policy, the premium
charged therefor, tne poiicv period and the limits of liability, and shall
contain an agreement or be endorsed that insurance is provided thereunder
in accoroance with tne coverage denned in this act as respects bodiiy injury
and deatn or propem damage, or both, and is subject to all the provisions
of this act
ie Sucb motor vehicle liability policy need not insure any liability
under any workmen's compensation law as provided in Title 35. Utah Code
Annotated 195$ as amended nor any liability on account of bodiiy injury
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t£ or death of an employee of the insured while engaged in the employment, other than domestic, of the insured, or while engaged in the operation, maintenance or repair of any such motor vehicle nor any liability for
damage to property owned by, rented to, in charge of or transported by
the insured.
(f > Even* motor vehicle liability policy shall be subject to the following
provisions which need not be contained therein:
(1) the liability of the insurance carrier with respect to the insurance
required by this act shall become absolute whenever injury or damage covered by said motor vehicle liability policy occurs; said policy* may not be
canceled or annulled as to such liability' by any agreement between the
insurance carrier and insured after the occurrence of the injury or damage;
no statement made by the insured or on his behalf and no violation of said
policy shall defeat or void said policy;
(2) the satisfaction by the insured of a judgment for such injury or
damage shall not be a condition precedent to the right or duty of the insurance carrier to make payment on account of such injury or damages;
(3) the insurance carrier shall have the right to settle any claim covered by the policy, and if such settlement is made in good faith, the amount
thereof shall be deductible from the limits of liability' specified in subdivision (2> of subsection (b) of this section:
U> the policy, the written application therefor, if any, and any rider
or endorsement which does not conflict with the provisions of the act shall
constitute the entire contract between the parties.
(g^ Any policy which grants the coverage required for a motor vehicle
liability' policy may also grant any lawful coverage in excess of or in addition to the coverage specified for a motor vehicle liability policy and such
excess or additional coverage shall not be subject to the provisions of this
act With respect to a policy which grants such excess or additional coverage the term 4tmotor vehicle liability policy" shall apply only to that part
of the coverage which is required by this section.
(b» Any motor vehicle liability policy may provide that the insured
shaL reimburse the insurance carrier for any payment the insurance earner would not have been obligated to make under the terms of the policy
except for the provisions of this act
(i * Any motor vehicle liability policy may provide for the prorating of
the insurance thereunder with other valid and collectible insurance
(j * Tne requirements of a motor vehicle liability policy may be fulfiliec
in tne policies of one or more insurance carriers which policies together
meet such requirements
(k Any binder issued pending the issuance of a motor vehicle liability
policy shall be deemed to fulfill the requirements for such a policy History. L 2951 CL 71 § 21 C. 1941
«ipp- D'-13-(L

Application
j m i g e c l l D t appbes oniy tt policies
reoinrec at proof o' tmancia responsibility
after tfct owner or operator na* Deer lr ar
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accident cr nas violated the motor vehicle
ia*& Vl&Y Fanr Bureau Ins Co \ Cnugg
(1957)61 2d 399 315 P 2d 277
Unless the msurec was withic the purne\x
o' this acf wnec * particular policj was
issued its provisions unless iliegai are subject tc the same con struct) or a* am othe*
contract Utah Farn: Bureau Ins Go \
Chugg (19571 6 I 2d 399 315 P 2d 277
Thij> sectiOE applies onh tc cases where
one is compelled u secure a pohc\ after ar
accident IL order tc be able to continue to
drive it pertains tc policies obtained wide"
the Safet\ Responsibiht} Act and has ne
application to policies writtet before am
accioent occurs Uestem Casualrv & Surett
Co v Transamenca ins Co (1971) 26 U 2d
5C 484 P 2d 1180
Policies presented as security under
No-Fault Act.
Insurance pohcie« used as securin unde"
31-41-5 of the No-Fault Insurance Act must
include mmirounr omniDu> coverage mciud
mg persons operating tne vehicle witr the
express or imphec permission of tne owner
insure* as provided ir tnis section Alistau
Ins Cc \ U S Fidelity & Guarant\ Co
(1980. 619 P 2d 329

Reasonable investigation.
Insure^ lost right u rescind pohc> b> failure to make reasonable investigation of
insurability without regard to provisions tf
subd (f)U) State Fanr Mutual Automobile
Ins Co v Uood (L971> 25 U 2d 427 482 P Id
892
Collateral Reference*.
Automobile habiht} insurance permisaion
or consent to employee s use of ca^ within
meaning of omnibus coverage clause 5 AI£
2d 600
Cancellation of compulsorj automobile
insurance 171 ALR 550 34 ALR 2d 1297
Construction and application of automatic
insurance clause or substitution provision on
automobile liability or indemnity pobcj $ |
ALR 2d 936
Recovery under automobile propertv damage policy express!} including or excluding
collision damage where vehicle strikes
embankment abutment roadbed or other
part o'higbwas 2? ALR 2d 389
Scope of clause of insurance policy covering injuries sustained while alighting from
or entering automobile 19 ALR 2d 51c
^ ahditv o' Moto- Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Act 35 ALR 2d 1011

41-12-21.1. Motor vehicle liability policy — Uninsured motorist
coverage required. Commencing on July 1, 1967. nc automobile liability
insurance pokc\ insuring against loss resulting frorr liability imposed by
la\* for bodih injur} o** deatu or propero damage suffered b> ant person
arising out of tne ownership maintenance or use of & motor vehicle shall
be debverea issued for delivery or renewed in this state witt respect to
an> motor vehicle registerec or principalis garaged ir this state umesfi
coverage is provided in SUCH policy or a supplement to it m limits fo~ bodin injury or oeatti set fortlr n sectior 41-12-5 under provisions filec witb
anc approved bt tne state insurance commission for tne protection o* persons insured tnereunoe~ wnc are iegaln entitled tc recover damages from
owners or operators of unmsurec motor vehicles and hn-ano-rur motor
vehicles because of bodin injury sickness o r disease including death,
resulting tnereirom The named insured snaP nave the right to reiec: such
coverage anc unless tne namec msurec reouests sucr coverage IL writing
suci co\e*-age need not t* proviaec it a renewa polio or a supplement
tc it wnere tne named insured nac rejected tne coverage m connection with
a policy previousn issued to him t>} tne same insurer
Hisfcorr L 19f' ci* 5S § .
Title of Acw
Ar ac D^vminf tns nc ponn & autom'
bw- habmr insurance ma^ De issueG o*

resewec wmcr Goes no p^onoe uiunsurec
moionsi co\ t~2Lg* — .LAWS 19€" cr 5^
Amount of co* emgt
1 i* tne ID tec o' tn* legrsiature ir aaon
inr rut sectiot tns at insurec wnc avails
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